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This research adds to the rich discussion on whether in-
creases in payment to crowdworkers lead to increases in 
performance quality by introducing the concept of perceived 
fairness in pay (PFP). PFP refers to the belief that one is 
fairly compensated for their work. We examine whether 
PFP mediates the impact of payment amount on the perfor-
mance quality of crowdworkers. We conducted a field ex-
periment with 152 crowdworkers performing a button-
clicking (BC) task and an instructional manipulation check 
(IMC) task. PFP mediated the impact of payment amount on 
performance quality in the BC task but not in the IMC task. 
PFP also mediated the impact of payment amount on satis-
faction and task time. Results suggest that PFP can help us 
better understand the relationship between payment and per-
formance quality in crowdsourcing. 
 Introduction   
 Researchers have been interested in whether financial 
incentives can increase the performance of crowdworkers  
(Mason and Watts 2009; Yin and Chen 2016; Yin, Chen, 
and Sun 2013). Originally, it was assumed that increases in 
payment should lead to better performance. At the onset, 
the logic seemed intuitive: As payment increased so should 
the motivation for crowdworkers to work harder and hence 
perform better. However, the results have not been as 
straightforward.  
Research seems to indicate that increases in payment can 
lead to increases in work performed (e.g., more tasks com-
pleted) but not performance quality (e.g., more tasks com-
pleted correctly; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; 
Mason and Watts 2009; Rogstadius et al. 2011). However, 
recently, Ho et al. (2015) conducted a comprehensive study 
on payment and performance quality of crowdworkers 
showing the opposite results. They found that payment 
increases in the form of bonuses can increase performance 
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quality but only for effort-responsive tasks. However, ac-
cording to Ho et al. (2015) the bonuses must be big enough 
to be salient. 
This research adds to this discussion in the following 
ways. First, we do not view crowdworkers as simply hu-
man central processing units (CPUs) that react rationally to 
the inputs given to them. Research on behavioral econom-
ics and psychology demonstrates that individuals can react 
differently to the same incentives (Folger 1977; Kahneman 
2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Their reactions often 
depend on the context, their perception of the incentives, 
their personal motivations, and their beliefs about their 
abilities (Camerer et al. 1997; Folger and Konovsky 1989; 
Greenberg and Colquitt 2013; Tversky and Kahneman 
1992). Second, to better understand human workers’ re-
sponses to incentives, we introduce the concept of per-
ceived fairness in pay (PFP). PFP refers to the belief that 
one is being fairly compensated. PFP has been used in or-
ganizational studies to explain the relationship between 
financial incentives and an employee’s performance, moti-
vation, and satisfaction (e.g., Folger 1977; Folger and 
Konovsky 1989). We propose that in crowdsourcing, when 
crowdworkers believe they are being paid fairly they per-
form better. Third, we extend the conversation to include 
crowdworker satisfaction. Little research has been directed 
at understanding how or whether payment leads to more 
satisfied crowdworkers. Yet, as we envision a better future 
for crowd work (see Kittur et al. 2013), outcomes like sat-
isfaction become increasingly important.  
To do this, we conducted a field experiment involving 
152 crowdworkers performing two types of tasks. One task 
was a button-clicking (BC) task, which represents an ef-
fort-responsive task, and the other an instructional manipu-
lation check (IMC) task, which represents a non-effort-
responsive attention-based task. Our results showed that 
PFP mediated the impact of the payment amount on the 
performance quality in the BC task but not the perfor-
mance quality in the IMC task, satisfaction and even total 
task completion time. 
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 This paper contributes to the ongoing conversation on 
the impact of financial incentives in crowd work in several 
important ways. First, it helps to answer the question of 
why increases in payment amount might or might not lead 
to better performance quality in effort-responsive tasks. 
When increases in payment amount lead to increases in 
PFP, they are likely to translate to better performance qual-
ity in effort-responsive tasks. Second, we also show that 
PFP can explain when increases in pay lead to more satis-
fied crowdworkers. Finally, the results of our study con-
tribute to our understanding on how to better design crowd 
systems. Systems designed to help facilitate PFP can pro-
mote more effective and satisfactory crowd work. 
Related Work and Hypotheses Development 
Scholars have been interested in the relationship be-
tween pay and performance in part to help understand how 
to minimize poor performance due to a lack of effort or 
attention on the part of crowdworkers (Goodman, Cryder, 
and Cheema 2013; Kittur et al. 2013). A complete review 
of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Howev-
er, both Ho et al. (2015) and Yin et al. (2013) provide a 
thorough discussion on the topic. What is clear is that PFP 
has not been used to examine this problem.  
Organizational scholars have also sought to understand 
when pay increases lead to better performance or more 
satisfied workers (Greenberg and Colquitt 2013), in large 
part because of similar concerns regarding poor perfor-
mance by workers. These scholars have discovered that the 
actual amount paid is not necessarily related to an employ-
ee’s performance or satisfaction (Jirjahn 2016; Tekleab, 
Bartol, and Liu 2005). Instead, changes in PFP explain 
why changes in payment can lead to increases in perfor-
mance and satisfaction (Folger 1977; Folger and Konovsky 
1989).  
PFP is based on Adams’ (1965) equity theory, which as-
serts that individuals attempt to match their effort with 
their associated outcomes. Individuals expect to be com-
pensated relative to the amount of effort they believe is 
required to perform their job (Greenberg and Colquitt 2013; 
Saunders and Thornhill 2003). Next, we explain how this 
applies in the context of crowdworkers. 
PFP should mediate the relationship between payment 
amount and performance quality of crowdworkers for sev-
eral reasons. First, actual payment should be positively 
associated with perceived fairness in pay among 
crowdworkers. Crowdworkers who are paid more should 
have higher expectations of how much work they need to 
perform to receive the payment (Mason and Watts 2009). 
Expectations set the threshold of what is fair and not fair 
(Greenberg and Colquitt 2013). Therefore, increases in 
payment amount should lead to increases in PFP.  
Second, perceived fairness in pay should be positively 
associated with performance quality among crowdworkers. 
As perceived fairness in pay increases, so should the 
amount of effort and attention on the part of the 
crowdworker (Colquitt et al. 2001; Janssen 2001). Increas-
es in the exertion of both physical effort and mental atten-
tion have been shown to increase workers’ performance in 
more traditional settings (Jirjahn 2016; Karriker and 
Williams 2007; Srinivasan, Maruping, and Robert 2010; 
Srinivasan, Maruping, and Robert 2012). We would also 
expect increases in physical effort and mental attention to 
be associated with increases in the performance quality of 
crowdworkers. 
Finally, the payment amount should increase perfor-
mance quality by increasing PFP among crowdworkers. Ho 
et al. (2015) identified the importance of ensuring that 
payment bonuses are big enough to be salient. We employ 
a similar logic by stating that increases in payment should 
be big enough to trigger increases in PFP. Increases in 
payment lead to increases in performance by increasing 
PFP. Hence the relationship between payment amount and 
performance quality should occur by increasing PFP.  
H1: PFP mediates the relationship between the payment 
amount and performance quality in a) the BC task and b) 
the IMC task. 
PFP should also mediate the relationship between pay-
ment amount and a crowdworker’s satisfaction. As stated 
in hypothesis 1, the payment amount should be positively 
related to PFP. PFP is also positively associated with satis-
faction. PFP can influence how much employees enjoy 
their job (Janssen 2001; Witt and Nye 1992). When em-
ployees believe they are paid fairly, they also believe that 
their work is respected and valued (Colquitt et al. 2013; 
Karriker and Williams 2007). These beliefs are drivers of 
job satisfaction (Hopkins and Weathington 2006; Skarlicki 
and Folger 1997). In fact, the organizational literature has 
found strong support for the relationship between PFP and 
job satisfaction (Janssen 2001; McFarlin and Sweeney 
1992). This should also be true for crowdworkers. 
 The influence of payment amount on satisfaction occurs 
when PFP is increased among crowdworkers. Payment 
drives satisfaction by increasing workers’ belief that they 
are being treated fairly (Gilliland 1993; Hopkins and 
Weathington 2006; Skarlicki and Folger 1997). This causes 
workers to believe that their contribution is respected and 
valued, leading to more satisfaction ( Robert and You 2013; 
Skarlicki and Folger 1997; Tekleab, Bartol, and Liu 2005). 
Therefore, the payment amount should increase satisfac-
tion by increasing perceived fairness in pay among 
crowdworkers.  
H2: PFP mediates the relationship between the payment 




We conducted a between-subjects field experiment on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with two treatments: 
high payment and low payment. In the high-payment 
treatment, participants were told that they would receive a 
payment of $1.00 for their participation ($7.5/hour based 
on an 8-minute task), while in the low-payment treatment, 
participants were informed that they would receive $0.40 
(roughly equating to $3/hour). Although it varies, MTurk 
workers typically view $6.00/hour as a fair payment (Mao 
et al. 2013). We chose payment conditions that were slight-
ly higher and lower than this amount. To ensure that the 
participants did not know they received less or more mon-
ey than other participants for the same task, we deployed 
only one experimental condition at a time. However, to 
further ensure worker population similarity across condi-
tions, we deployed all conditions on weekday mornings.  
However, to ensure fair treatment and to help create a 
sustainable crowd work environment, we paid additional 
compensation after the experiment to reach a compensation 
rate of $7.5 per hour, which was in accordance with the 
ongoing payment goals on MTurk (“Fair Payment” 2016). 
Because we did this after all the data were collected and 
participants didn’t know about this extra compensation at 
the time they completed the task, we do not believe this 
influenced the outcome of our study.  
Tasks 
To explore the effects of perceived fairness in pay on 
performance quality and satisfaction, we employed two 
tasks that were used in previous crowd work studies (e.g., 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; Yin et al. 
2013). The first was an effort-responsive button-clicking 
(BC) task that measured the accuracy of a participant’s 
response. The second was an instructional manipulation 
check (IMC) task that measured whether the participants 
paid attention to the instructions. These tasks were chosen 
for two reasons. First, they represent both an effort- and a 
non-effort-responsive attention-based task, which allows us 
to generalize our findings to the emerging importance of 
task type. Second, these tasks measure performance quality 
and have been widely used in the literature on crowd work 
(e.g., Goodman et al. 2013; Horton and Chilton 2010; Yin 
et al. 2013). Third, they represent two of the most critical 
task elements found in many other tasks: effort and atten-
tion. For example, other commonly used tasks, such as data 
cleaning and image labeling, involve some degree of both 
of these elements. Finally, these tasks allow us to better 
tease apart effort and attention, thereby ruling out any po-
tential confound associated with other tasks that involve 
some degree of both.  
The button-clicking (BC) task 
The BC task was adapted from previous papers (Horton, 
Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; Yin et al. 2013). There were 
three buttons on the screen, one on the top, one in the mid-
dle, and one at the bottom. The “target” button was labeled 
“Click me” and was green, and the other two buttons were 
labeled “Not me,” and one was white and the other orange. 
Figure 1 shows the interface. 
 
Figure 1. Interface of the button-clicking task. 
The interface refreshed once a button was clicked and 
the three buttons randomly changed their position, moving 
from the top, middle, and bottom. Participants were asked 
to click the target button as many times as they could in 2 
minutes. 
The instructional manipulation check (IMC) task 
The IMC task is used to detect satisficing behavior (Op-
penheimer et al. 2009). In this task, participants were 
shown a series of three screens. Each screen had a title on 
the top followed by a paragraph, a question in the middle 
with several answer options, and a continue button at the 
bottom. In the first two screens, they were asked to read a 
paragraph, which instructed them to make a preference 
choice among several options. But in the third screen they 
were instructed to avoid making their preference choice 
and instead just click the title (see Figure 2). Participants 
who read and paid attention just clicked the title and those 
who did not pay attention made their preference choices.  
Figure 2. Interface of the IMC task, subtask 3. 
Procedure 
Participants received consent forms when they arrived. 
After completing the form, participants were asked to fill 
out a demographic questionnaire, which included questions 
about their employment, wages, and trust disposition. Par-
ticipants then completed the two tasks. To avoid any order-
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ing effects (Newell and Ruths 2016), the order of the BC 
and IMC tasks was randomized. This resulted in a 2 (low 
payment vs. high payment) X 2 (task order 1 vs. task order 
2) design shown in Table 1. Participants then completed a 
questionnaire to measure their PFP and satisfaction.  
 
Treatment Order 1 Order 2 
Low-payment $0.40 + IMC first $0.40 + BC first 
High-payment $1.00 + IMC first $1.00 + BC first 
Table 1. Treatment conditions 
Participants 
To avoid any effects of culture differences (e.g., Good-
man, Cryder, and Cheema 2013), we restricted the experi-
ment to participants located in the United States. A total of 
160 participants finished our experiment. After excluding 
observations with missing data, we had 152 participants in 
total, with 77 in the low-payment condition and 75 in the 
high-payment condition. Their age ranged 19–58 years, 
with a mean of 32.84 years.  
Independent and Dependent Variables 
Perceived fairness in pay (PFP) 
To measure PFP, we adapted items using 5-point Likert 
scale from Colquitt (2001): (1) “My payment reflects the 
effort I have put into the task,” (2) “My payment is appro-
priate for the work I have completed,” and (3) “My pay-
ment is justified given my performance.” Their Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.95. 
Clicks on target — performance for the BC task 
To measure a participant’s performance quality in the 
button-clicking task, we used the number of clicks on the 
target button (Yin et al. 2013).  
Title click — performance for the IMC task 
We measured performance for the IMC task as either “1” 
if participants clicked the title on the third screen or “0” if 
they did not; thus this was a binary outcome variable.  
Total task completion time  
We also included total task completion time in our anal-
ysis. This was calculated by measuring the time (in se-
conds) between when the task was accepted and submitted.  
Satisfaction 
To measure satisfaction, we adapted three items using 5-
point Likert scale from Dennis et al. (1999): (1) “I am sat-
isfied with the task processes,” (2) “I feel satisfied with my 
performance on these tasks,” and (3) “Overall, I am satis-
fied with my experience.” The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87. 
Control Variables 
We controlled for several factors. We controlled for age, 
gender, education, average weekly wage from MTurk, and 
employment status.  
Gender was coded as a dummy variable where “0” rep-
resented female and “1” represented male. Education was 
coded as a dummy variable where a college degree or 
higher was coded as “1” and others “0.” Employment was 
coded as a binary variable, with “1” referring to full-time 
employment or student status and “0” referring to part-time 
employment or student status.  
We also controlled for disposition to trust, which refers 
to an individual’s general predisposition to trust other peo-
ple and is akin to a personality trait (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995). It is an important control variable in the 
study of PFP  (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007). We used 
items from a 5-point Likert scale to measure disposition to 
trust (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, and Leidner 1998; Robert, Dennis, 
and Hung 2009; Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 1996). Ex-
ample items included: (1) “Most people can be counted on 
to do what they say they will do” and (2) “Most people 
answer personal questions honestly.” Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.90. 
Results 
We used SPSS version 22.0 (IBM, Armonk, NY) to test 
the hypotheses. Table 2 lists the means, standard deviations 
and correlations of all variables and Table 3 shows the 
means and standard deviations of the control variables. Our 
analysis strategy consisted of three sets of statistical tests. 
First, because we employed a between-subjects field exper-
iment we employed ANCOVA and MANCOVA to test our 
treatments. Specifically, we used ANCOVA to determine 
whether the actual payment amount could explain differ-
ences in PFP. MANCOVA was used to determine whether 
pay amount and PFP were associated with differences in 
outcomes between the two treatments.  
Second, because the IMC task had a binary outcome we 
employed logistic regression. ANCOVA and MANCOVA 
cannot be used to examine binary outcomes. Third, to test 
whether increases in actual pay impacted performance 
quality and satisfaction through PFP (i.e. mediation) we 
performed a Sobel test. The Sobel test is a statistical analy-
sis to determine whether the effects of one variable on an-
other variable occur through a third, mediating variable 
(Nguyen, Dabbish, and Kiesler 2015; Sobel 1982). The 
Sobel test accomplishes this by statistically examining 
whether the indirect effects associated with the mediation 
are significant.  
Results are shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7. In these tables, 
Model 1 displays the effects of the control variables. Mod-
el 2 shows the effects of the independent variable (payment 
level), and model 3 includes the mediator (PFP) used to 
test the mediation effects on each outcome. We also in-
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clude total task completion time as an additional analysis 
because it is often used as important measure of efficiency 
(e.g., Frøkjær, Hertzum, and Hornbæk 2000).  
Manipulation Check  
To check whether our manipulation of high and low 
payments has the desired effect we conducted a manipula-
tion check. A t-test showed that the mean PFP of the high-
pay condition (mean = 3.59, standard deviation [SD] = 
1.10) was significantly higher than in the low-pay condi-
tion (mean = 2.92, SD = 1.08) with t = 3.81, p < 0.001. 







Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50
Age 32.13 8.09 33.57 8.57
Education 0.70 0.46 0.77 0.42
Employment 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.50
Weekly wage 
(on MTurk) 
5.13 1.16 5.44 1.21
Disposition to 
trust 
3.25 0.86 3.22 0.89
Significance of correlations: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
N=152; 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations of control variables 
Measurement Validity  
We conducted a factor analysis. Cross-loadings were 
under 0.37 and items loaded at or above 0.78 (see Table 4). 
 
 
Items Disposition to trust (DTT) 
Perceived fairness 
in pay (PFP) Satisfaction 
DTT 1 0.88 0.00 0.20 
DTT 2 0.86 0.03 0.08 
DTT 3 0.87 0.18 0.09 
DTT 4 0.86 0.15 0.11 
PFP 1 0.06 0.90 0.29 
PFP 2 0.13 0.92 0.20 
PFP 3 0.13 0.92 0.25 
Satisfaction 1 0.17 0.37 0.79 
Satisfaction 2 0.17 0.12 0.86 
Satisfaction 3 0.09 0.33 0.86 
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 4.  Factor loadings 
Mediation, Indirect Effects and the Sobel Test 
Originally, mediation was defined by Baron and Ken-
ny’s three steps for mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986). 
The three steps are: step 1, the independent variable should 
be a predictor of the dependent variable; step 2, the inde-
pendent variable should be a predictor of the mediator var-
iable; step 3, the mediator variable should be a predictor of 
the dependent variable, in the presence of the independent 
variable. Full mediation is said to occur if the independent 
variable is no longer a significant predictor of the de-
pendent variable in the presence of the mediator variable. 
Partial mediation is said to occur when the independent 
variable is still a significant predictor of the dependent 
variable in the presence of the mediator variable.  
However, scholars have reassessed the requirements for 
mediation in response to several criticisms. First, scholars 
have now dropped Baron and Kenny’s (1986) step 1 re-
quirement. Scholars have found that the independent varia-
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9       10 
1 Instruction reading 0.82 0.38     
2 Number of clicks on target 146.55 31.93 0.01     
3 Total time 1130.25 794.60 -0.09 -0.14     
4 Satisfaction 4.06 0.84 0.05 0.12 -0.12     
5 Payment level 0.49 0.50 -0.06 -0.05 -0.18* 0.25 **    
6 Gender 0.49 0.50 -0.09 0.07 -0.07 -0.23 -0.03    
7 Age 32.84 8.33 0.10 -0.14 0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.31 ***   
8 Full-time work&study 0.55 0.50 -0.15 -0.10 -0.03 -0.14 -0.13 0.08 -0.12  
9 Weekly MTurk wage 5.28 1.19 0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.13 0.10 0.02 -0.06  
10 Disposition to trust 3.19 0.70 0.16 -0.08 -0.03 0.33 *** -0.01 -0.15 0.12 -0.05 -0.10  
11 Perceived fairness in pay  3.25 1.13 0.01 0.12 -0.24** 0.51 *** 0.30*** -0.14 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.23** 
N=152; Significance of correlations: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  
Table 2. Means, standard deviations and correlations 
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ble can still indirectly impact the dependent variable 
through the mediator variable, even when it does not di-
rectly impact the dependent variable (Shrout and Bolger 
2002). Second, scholars have now developed formal statis-
tical tests of mediation. The Sobel test is widely used as a 










Control variables    
Gender 1.36  1.39  1.38  
Age 1.02  1.02  1.02  
Education 2.29  2.17  2.17  
Employment 2.00  2.14  2.16  
Weekly wage (on MTurk) 1.07  1.10  1.10  
Disposition to trust 1.46  1.46  1.45  
Independent variable    
Payment level  1.54 1.58 
Mediator    
Perceived fairness in pay   1.04 
N=152; Significance of coefficients: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  
Table 6.  Results of the logistic regression predicting title click 
Mediation: Empirical Test of Indirect Effects  
To test our hypotheses, we performed three steps. First, 
we tested the direct effects of actual payment and PFP on 
each outcome variable. Second, we determined whether 
actual payment increased PFP. Finally, we conducted a 
Sobel test to determine whether the indirect effects of 
payment amount through PPF were significant.  
Step 1, the payment amount did not impact performance 
quality in the BC task (B = –3.60, standard error [SE] = 
5.30, t = –0.68, p = 0.50) as seen in Table 5 or performance 
quality in the IMC task (B = 0.43, SE = 0.46, 95% CI [0.63, 
3.78], odds ratio = 1.54, p = 0.34) as seen in Table 6. This 
supports previous research on the impact of payment 
amount in the crowdsourcing literature (Mason and Watts 
2009; Yin et al. 2013). However, actual payment did pre-
dict satisfaction (B = 0.40, SE = 0.13, t = 3.19, p < 0.01) as 
seen in Table 5.   
Variables 
Perceived fairness in pay 
Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables   
Gender -0.32  -0.31 
Age -0.02  -0.02 
Education 0.09  0.02 
Employment 0.13  0.22 
Weekly wage (on MTurk) -0.05  -0.08 
Disposition to trust 0.32 ** 0.33 ** 
Independent variable   
Payment level  0.75 *** 
N=152; Significance of coefficients: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Table 7.  Results of ANCOVA analyses 
Step 2, we examined whether PFP was associated with 
increases in performance quality and satisfaction. PFP was 
associated with increases in performance quality for the 
BC task (B = 5.61, SE = 2.53, t = 2.22, p < 0.05) as seen in 
Variables 
Number of clicks on target Satisfaction Total time (in seconds) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables       
Gender 1.54 1.51 3.27 -0.31 * -0.31 * -0.21 -139.22 -141.27 -187.48
Age -0.52 -0.51 -0.40 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.75 0.41 -2.51
Education -4.89 -4.55 -4.66 0.04 0.00 0.00 -256.18 -227.94 -224.92
Employment -6.98 -7.43 -8.68 -0.20 -0.15 -0.22 -8.35 -45.15 -12.15
Weekly wage (on 
MTurk) 1.44 1.62 2.08 0.01 -0.01 0.01 66.85 81.59 69.52
Disposition to trust -2.08 -2.11 -3.93 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.19** -30.21 -32.44 15.34
Independent variable       
Payment level  -3.60 -7.82 0.40 ** 0.17  -298.19*     -187.52
Mediator       
Perceived fairness in pay   5.61*  0.31***  -147.19 * 
N=152; Significance of coefficients: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  




Table 5, but not for the IMC task (B = 0.04, SE = 0.21, 95% 
CI [0.68, 1.57], odds ratio = 1.04, p = 0.86) as seen in Ta-
ble 6. However, PFP did lead to increases in satisfaction (B 
= 0.31, SE = 0.06, t = 5.60, p < 0.001) see Table 5. 
Next, we examined whether payment amount impacted 
PFP. To accomplish this, we conducted an ANCOVA. Re-
sults are shown in Table 7. Payment amount was signifi-
cantly related to PFP (B = 0.75, SE = 0.17, t = 4.37, p < 
0.001). Next we discuss the test results of the mediation 
effects related to each hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1a: Performance quality in the BC task  
The Sobel test was conducted to evaluate hypothesis 1a. 
Results of the Sobel test indicate that the indirect effect of 
actual payment on the performance quality of the button-
clicking task was mediated through PFP (Z = 1.98, p < 
0.05). H1a was supported.  
Hypothesis 1b: Performance quality in the IMC task  
Hypothesis 1b asserts that PFP mediates the relationship 
between the actual payment and the performance quality in 
the IMC task. Sobel test results showed that H1b was not 
supported with Z = 0.19, p =0.85. 
Hypothesis 2: Satisfaction  
The Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of pay-
ment amount on satisfaction was mediated through PFP (Z 
= 3.45, p < 0.001), supporting H2.  
Additional analysis: Total task completion time 
Additionally, we tested whether PFP mediated the rela-
tionship between actual pay and the total task time. As 
reported in Table 5, increases in PFP (B = –147.19, SE = 
62.10, t = –2.37, p < 0.05) were associated with decreases 
in total time. The Sobel test was significant (Z = 2.08, p < 
0.05). Increases in actual payment led to faster total task 
completion time by increasing PFP.  
Summary of Results 
Results of this study can be organized into the two major 
findings. First, PFP mediated the impact of payment 
amount on performance quality in the button-clicking task 
but not in in the IMC task. In fact, neither payment amount 
nor PFP was significantly associated with performance 
quality in the IMC task. Like prior researchers, we found 
that the benefits associated with more pay vary by task 
type. Higher pay increased performance quality in effort-
responsive tasks but not in non-effort-responsive attention-
based tasks.  
There are at least two potential explanations for why 
PFP was positively associated with performance quality in 
the BC task and not the IMC task. One explanation is the 
task completion time. Crowdworkers who were paid more 
might have been too motivated to complete the task too 
quickly. Increases in motivation might help in the BC task 
but not in the IMC task. For example, crowdworkers who 
were paid more and had higher levels of perceived fairness 
in pay performed the task much faster (mean = 978.44, SD 
= 652.11) than their counterparts (mean = 1,252.33, SD = 
883.83). We examined the correlations between task time 
and performance quality for the BC task (correlation coef-
ficient = –0.14, p = .08) and IMC task (correlation coeffi-
cient = –0.09, p = .26). Both were not significant at the .05 
level. Another explanation could be a lack of power. We 
conducted a power analysis. Power analyses for H1a = .99, 
and H1b = .83 both indicated high statistical power. 
 Second, PFP mediated the impact of payment amount on 
satisfaction (supporting H2) and total task completion time 
(an additional analysis). Previous studies investigating the 
impact of payment magnitude on task time among 
crowdworkers have found no significant effect (Rogstadius 
et al. 2011; Yin et al. 2013). We could not find any study 
examining the impact of payment amount on satisfaction 
among crowdworkers. This suggests that PFP could be 
used to help understand when pay increases can lead to 
other types of crowdworker outcomes.  
Discussion 
 Our goal was to determine whether PFP can help us 
better understand the relationship between pay and 
crowdworkers’ performance quality. To that end, our re-
sults demonstrate the potential usefulness of the inclusion 
of PFP in the study of pay and performance quality in 
crowdsourcing.  
Contributions and Implications  
 First, in this paper we propose an alternative view of 
crowdworkers, their motivations, and the use of financial 
incentives to increase their performance. In doing so, we 
acknowledge that crowdworkers are not human CPUs that 
simply react to increases and decreases in the inputs given 
to them. Instead, they are individuals with a sense of fair-
ness who can react irrationally and emotionally based on 
their perceptions of their treatment.  
 Second, in doing so this study broadens the discussion 
on pay and crowd work to include satisfaction and task 
time. When crowdworkers thought they were paid fairly, 
not only did they work faster, but they also were more sat-
isfied. There has been much discussion on the importance 
of fair pay and the need for better treatment of crowdwork-
ers (e.g., Irani et al. 2013; Martin et al. 2014), along with 
the discussion on creating a better workplace for 
crowdworkers (Kittur et al. 2013). Understanding the role 
of PFP in promoting satisfaction is an important step for-
ward.  
 Third, we identified an important mediator that links the 
payment amount and performance quality in effort-
responsive tasks. Our results showed that pay increases had 
an indirect effect on performance quality by increasing an 
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individuals’ PFP. To improve performance quality, future 
research can further explore other predictors of PFP. For 
example, the relationship quality between employees and 
their employer is an important predictor of PFP (Colquitt et 
al. 2013). It is not clear how such findings can be directly 
translated to a crowdsourcing context. On one hand, 
Turkers may view requestors as their employer. Turkers 
are aware of a requester’s reputation, either through direct 
experience or through reputation systems. Turkers may 
decide to accept a task based on this information. From this 
point of view, the requester is the employer. On the other 
hand, Turkers normally perform work for many different 
requestors, and in at least some cases their relationship 
with a requestor could be a one-time occurrence. 
However, MTurk sets up the overall working conditions 
between the worker and the requestor. Workers maintain 
their relationship with MTurk no matter which requester 
they work for. Their relationship with MTurk is also much 
more permanent than their relationship with a particular 
requestor. Can this lead Turkers to view MTurk as their 
employer? Can Turkers also view both as their employer? 
We simply do not know. To the best of our knowledge no 
research has been conducted on this particular topic in the 
context of crowdsourcing. Future research is needed in this 
area and others to begin to understand what other factors 
are likely to drive PFP in the context of crowdsourcing. 
Fourth, this paper offers a possible explanation for the 
seemingly conflicting results regarding the relationship 
between payment amount and performance quality. Some 
researchers found that increases in pay did not lead to in-
creases in crowdworker performance quality (e.g., 
Buhrmester et al. 2011; Mason and Watts 2009), while 
others found payment increases did have direct effects on 
performance quality (Ho et al. 2015).  
We found that the payment amount influenced perfor-
mance quality via the mediator of PFP. Ho et al. (2015) 
suggested that increases in pay may only lead to increases 
in performance quality when they are big enough to be 
salient. Our results help to explain this argument. Payment 
increases should have direct effects on performance quality 
when they are big enough to be salient. However, when 
pay increases are not large enough to be salient, increases 
in pay will not have a direct effect on performance quality. 
Individuals with different backgrounds and personalities 
may differ on what amount is big enough to be salient. 
Therefore, the same pay increase does not necessarily 
translate to being big enough for every individual. The 
inclusion of PFP may help us capture these differences and 
provides the link between pay increases and increases in 
performance quality for effort-responsive tasks.    
Fifth, PFP did not help us understand why increases in 
pay do not lead to increases in performance quality in non-
effort-responsive tasks or in our case attention-based tasks. 
Our results are similar to those in other research: we found 
that increases in pay lead to increases in performance in 
effort-responsive tasks only (see Ho et al. 2015). It would 
seem that increases in pay lead to more effort but not more 
attention. One explanation is that attention tasks are much 
more dependent on training. Crowdworkers might have to 
be trained to become better at attention tasks. Future stud-
ies could examine whether training is more or less im-
portant for attention tasks relative to effort tasks. 
Finally, this study has implications for the design of 
crowdsourcing platforms. Crowdsourcing systems can be 
used to facilitate PFP by convincing crowdworkers that the 
payment is fair relative to the task. There are two ways to 
accomplish this objective. One approach is to explain why 
the payment is fair relative to the task requirements. 
Crowdworkers might be more likely to believe payment is 
fair when they understand how the amount was determined. 
This could be accomplished by having the system display 
the breakdown of the overall task into subtasks. The pay-
ment relative to the amount of work anticipated for each 
subtask could be displayed alongside each subtask. This 
would provide greater transparency on how the payment 
amount was derived. This, in turn, could be used to facili-
tate perceived fairness in pay without actually increasing 
payment.  
Another way would be to add a feature to the system that 
calculates the active time participants spend to complete 
the task. Amazon Mechanical Turk currently provides 
workers with the average completion time for a task. But 
this number is not accurate because workers rarely work 
straight through a task and often get distracted by other 
activities (e.g., completing other tasks). Therefore, the 
listed average task time is likely to be an overestimation of 
the actual time required to complete the task. This overes-
timation is likely to lead crowdworkers to believe that 
payment should be higher relative to the actual time need-
ed to complete the task. We suggest developing a tool to 
calculate the active time that a worker actually spends on a 
task. All other things being equal, a more accurate estimate 
of the actual task time is likely to increase perceptions of 
fairness in pay.  
Limitations 
This study is limited in several ways. First, we only con-
ducted the experiment in one crowdsourcing platform. Se-
cond, we restricted our participants to the United States in 
order to rule out potential cultural differences (Shaw, Hor-
ton, and Chen 2011). One of our next steps is to test 
whether our results hold in other populations. Third, in 
order to make the study comparable to previous studies on 
performance (e.g., Mao et al. 2013; Yin et al. 2013), we 
didn’t set restrictions on approval rate. Future work needs 
to be done on Master Turkers. Fourth, the two tasks were 
chosen to better tease apart the effect on attention-based 
and effort-responsive tasks. However, future study could 
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deploy tasks that are more realistic and commonly used in 
crowdsourcing platforms. Finally, this study didn’t include 
intrinsic motivations. It would be interesting to see the 
interaction effects of the magnitude of financial incentives, 
perceived fairness in pay, and intrinsic motivations on task 
performance and satisfaction. 
Conclusion 
Via the lens of perceived fairness in pay, this paper 
sought to extend our understanding of the relationship be-
tween financial incentives and crowdworkers’ performance. 
This study highlights the importance of perceptions of fair-
ness in pay and indicates potential design applications to 
improve fairness perceptions and task performance in 
crowdsourcing markets. 
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